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NO FARE: REMEDYING THE MEMBER BUSINESS
LOAN LOOPHOLE
Leili A. Saber*
The member business loan exemption of the Federal Credit Union Act was
the driving force behind the New York City taxi medallion loan crisis that led
to over 950 bankrupt taxi drivers and eight suicides. This Note analyzes the
exemption as the legislature’s balancing act to reconcile two competing
policy aims: keeping lenders safe while encouraging them to lend to risky
borrowers.
Viewed through the lens of the taxi medallion crisis, this Note
demonstrates the severe harm that this loophole creates. Exempting credit
unions from regulatory limits has left vulnerable borrowers subject to the
adverse designs of powerful actors. Ultimately, this Note proposes statutory
loan protections with severe penalties for the exempt institutions to keep the
credit unions and borrowers financially safe and sound.
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INTRODUCTION
The yellow taxicab has long been an icon of New York City. A shot of a
street crowded with yellow cabs is the tried and true way directors have cued
the New York City location in movies and television. For many immigrants,
however, the taxi symbolizes something more meaningful: the American
dream.1 Many who immigrated to the United States in pursuit of a better life
spoke of the medallion, the prized permit to drive a taxi in New York City,
in reverent tones of opportunity.2 To own a medallion meant that one had
“made it”—it was the golden ticket to a better life in a new home. However,
since 2014, that dream has become an unremitting nightmare of crippling
debt and indentured servitude3 that, for some, has ended in suicide.4
In May 2019, the New York Times published a two part series on the New
York City medallion loan crisis.5 Taxi industry leaders helped artificially
inflate medallion prices to over one million dollars in 2014, over five times
what they had been twelve years earlier,6 as regulatory officials turned a blind
eye to the looming crisis.7 The investigation, however, failed to explore the
original statutory root of this crisis, which is the subject of this Note. The
statute was there long before the catastrophe and set it in motion.

1. Richard Perez-Pena, For 53, the Promise of America Fits on a Taxicab, N.Y. TIMES
(May 11, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/11/nyregion/for-53-the-promise-ofamerica-fits-on-a-taxicab.html [https://perma.cc/7HFA-TLCS].
2. See id.
3. See Brian M. Rosenthal, ‘They Were Conned’: How Reckless Loans Devastated a
Generation of Taxi Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/
19/nyregion/nyc-taxis-medallions-suicides.html [https://perma.cc/C6ZQ-3QT9].
4. See Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Why Are Taxi Drivers in New York Killing Themselves?,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/02/nyregion/taxi-driverssuicide-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/VW6G-TUC9].
5. Brian M. Rosenthal, As Thousands of Taxi Drivers Were Trapped in Loans, Top
Officials Counted the Money, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/
19/nyregion/taxi-medallions.html [https://perma.cc/YY93-4PL7]; Rosenthal, supra note 3.
6. Rosenthal, supra note 3.
7. See Rosenthal, supra note 5 (discussing the failures of the three agencies involved in
the crisis: the National Credit Union Administration, the New York State Department of
Financial Services, and the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission); see also infra
Part II.D (explaining how the three agencies were all aware of the impending medallion
catastrophe, yet did little to stop it).
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The key component is a loophole in the Federal Credit Union Act8 (FCUA)
that permitted some credit unions to grant limit-busting numbers of risky
loans to those who wanted to buy taxi medallions.9 With this exemption,
credit unions went on a lending binge and did not stop until the intertwined
machinery of medallion financing, comprised of lenders, borrowers, and
regulators, finally crashed.10
This led more than 950 taxi drivers to file for bankruptcy, drove at least
eight drivers to suicide, and cost the National Credit Union Share Insurance
Fund (NCUSIF) approximately $765.5 million.11 New York City initially
made some efforts to help the drivers12 and even discussed the possibility of
a $600 million bailout,13 but these solutions ignored the statutory exemption
that saddled borrowers with such crippling debt and triggered the events that
led to this crisis. Until it is addressed, New York City taxis will remain the
icon of an American dream turned sour.
This Note is divided into three parts. Part I describes the social and
legislative history of credit unions and the FCUA exemption that laid the
foundation for the crisis. Part II chronicles the medallion loan crisis and the
cast of characters that created it. To prevent similar failures, Part III proposes
statutorily mandated protections for unsophisticated credit union borrowers,
such as loan interest rate and maturity caps, with penalties for credit unions
that fail to comply.
I. CREDIT UNIONS AND THE MEMBER BUSINESS LOAN EXEMPTION
This part examines the legal framework of credit unions, their regulation,
and the member business loan (MBL) exemption that is at the core of this
Note. Part I.A introduces the purpose and origins of credit unions and
8. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751–1795k.
9. See infra Part I.D (analyzing the carveout in the FCUA that exempted certain credit
unions at the heart of this crisis from protective regulations).
10. See NCUA OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW OF MELROSE CREDIT
UNION, LOMTO FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, AND BAY RIDGE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 1–2 (2019),
https://www.ncua.gov/files/audit-reports/oig-material-loss-review-march-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RQZ-3TWP] (discussing how some failed credit unions had high
percentages of medallion loans); see also Rosenthal, supra note 3 (detailing how the
mechanisms of medallion loans created a market bubble that ultimately burst).
11. See NCUA OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 6–7; Rosenthal, supra note 5.
12. Brian M. Rosenthal, Facing Ruin, Taxi Drivers to Get $10 Million Break and Loan
Safeguards, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/nyregion/
nyc-taxi-medallions.html [https:// perma.cc/93PM-RUA6] (describing Mayor Bill de Blasio’s
proposed initiatives to forgive up to ten million dollars in medallion owner fees and to set up
a center to provide financial counseling for drivers).
13. Stephen Nessen & Elizabeth Kim, Taxi Task Force Proposes $600 Million Fund for
Struggling Cab Drivers Affected by Medallion Crisis, GOTHAMIST (Jan. 31, 2020, 3:23 PM),
https://gothamist.com/news/taxi-task-force-proposes-600-million-fund-struggling-cabdrivers-affected-medallion-crisis [https://perma.cc/9QK7-D8ER]. However, just a few
months later, in July 2020, Mayor de Blasio stated that due to the impact of COVID-19, the
city did not have the resources for the driver bailout. Jake Offenhartz, COVID Crisis Sends
Yellow Taxi Drivers into Financial Freefall, Report Shows, GOTHAMIST (July 30, 2020, 1:36
PM), https://gothamist.com/news/covid-crisis-sends-yellow-taxi-drivers-financial-freefallreport-shows [https://perma.cc/4KG6-GPYS].

1074

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

discusses their membership requirements. Part I.B explains the FCUA and
the federal regulatory supervision of credit unions. Part I.C provides
background on the financial crisis that led to stricter regulation of MBLs.
Finally, Part I.D defines the MBL exemption and examines its legislative
history and evolution.
A. Credit Unions: You Can Do It, We Can Help
Credit unions are member-owned financial institutions with particular
membership requirements.14 By virtue of this fact, they are nonprofit and
can offer higher savings and lower borrowing rates.15 This structure sets
them apart from banks, which have stockholders without membership
conditions and operate as for-profit businesses.16 Traditionally, membership
(also known as the common bond) requirements for credit unions have often
revolved around one’s occupation,17 so they became self-help associations
for tradesmen and lower-income individuals.18 By pooling their small
savings together, members could create a fund from which they could extend
credit to other constituents.19 This solved the members’ problem of not
having access to credit when banks routinely shunned them on account of
their modest incomes and poor finances.20 More formally, credit unions are
defined as “a cooperative association organized . . . for the purpose of
promoting thrift among its members and creating a source of credit for
provident or productive purposes.”21

14. What Is a Credit Union?, MYCREDITUNION.GOV, https://www.mycreditunion.gov/
about-credit-unions/credit-union-different-than-a-bank [https://perma.cc/LV3V-UECB] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2020).
15. See generally Credit Union and Bank Rates, NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., https://
www.ncua.gov/analysis/Pages/industry/credit-union-bank-rates.aspx [https://perma.cc/AL4D
-YAAY] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
16. See Issues Currently Facing the Credit Union Industry: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs.,
105th Cong. 68 (1997) (statement of Robert D. Anderson, President and CEO, Liberty Check
Printers).
17. Stephen F. Ambrose Jr., The Legality of Credit Union Share Draft Accounts Under
Federal Law, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1135, 1135 n.1 (1978).
18. See id. at 1135; see also Robert Botkin, Rationalizing the Credit Union Tax
Exemption, 19 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 158, 159–61 (2019) (describing how
credit unions were designed to create accessible credit for lower-income individuals, usually
farmers).
19. Ambrose, supra note 17, at 1139; see also MARVA WILLIAMS, FINANCIAL SERVICES
FOR PEOPLE OF MODEST MEANS: LESSONS FROM LOW-INCOME CREDIT UNIONS 3 (2004).
20. “When Congress enacted the FCUA, sponsors of the legislation emphasized that the
cooperative nature of credit unions allows them to make credit available to persons who
otherwise would not qualify for loans.” Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Federal Credit Union Act of 1934 (FCUA) (12 U.S.C.A §§ 1751 to 1795k), 89
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 357, § 3 (2014); see also Kelly Culp, Comment, Banks v. Credit Unions: The
Turf Struggle for Consumers, 53 BUS. LAW. 193, 193–94 (1997) (delineating how credit
unions were intended to service lower-income workers who banks refused to serve).
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1752(1).
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Credit unions began in Europe and achieved considerable success there.22
Rejected by banks, farmers in need of funds were forced to turn to lenders
who charged ruinous interest rates.23 To remedy this, Germany created one
of the earliest known credit unions24 to help farmers purchase farming
necessities.25
Credit unions made their way to the United States in 1909,26 after Edward
Filene, a Massachusetts businessman, observed India’s rural cooperative
banks during his travels.27 He saw their potential to help American workers
and became instrumental in passing the Massachusetts Credit Union Act,
upon which the FCUA was later built.28
B. Expanded Credit Union Growth and the FCUA
After the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the
FCUA into law, which organized credit unions under federal law and
established their regulatory supervision in turn.29 The legislation came after
Congress noted the impressive stability of credit unions during the Great
Depression.30 Consequently, the FCUA was enacted to create a safer
alternative for organizing financial institutions at the federal level for people
of small means.31 Workers and small business owners could apply for
affordable credit through a national system of cooperative credit.32
Initially, responsibility for administering the FCUA was assigned to the
Farm Credit Administration (FCA).33 The FCA was charged with addressing

22. See Stuart R. Levine, The American Credit Union Industry Still Embodies Its
Founding Values, CUINSIGHT (May 6, 2013), https://www.cuinsight.com/the-american-credit
-union-industry-still-embodies-its-founding-values.html [https://perma.cc/V2KQ-QVV2].
23. Id.
24. The Heddesorf Credit Union was established by Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen in
1864. Id.
25. Id.
26. Historical Timeline, NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., https://www.ncua.gov/aboutncua/historical-timeline [https://perma.cc/ZGE8-Y8R7] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
27. Levine, supra note 22.
28. See id.; see also Historical Timeline, supra note 26.
29. Levine, supra note 22; see also Historical Timeline, supra note 26. The FCUA also
applies in part to state chartered credit unions that are federally insured under the NCUA.
Lauzon, supra note 20, § 2 n.1; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1781. For purposes of this Note, “credit
union” refers to both.
30. See Lauzon, supra note 20. The stability of the credit unions was in particularly sharp
contrast to that of the banks and other lending institutions that collapsed during the Great
Depression. Id. While thousands of banks failed during that time, zero credit unions did. S.
O. Crofton et al., Credit Union Capital, Insolvency, and Mergers Before and After Share
Insurance, ESSAYS IN ECON. & BUS. HIST., 2020, at 1, 1.
31. Lauzon, supra note 20.
32. Culp, supra note 20, at 194.
33. The FCA was responsible for federally chartered credit unions from 1934 to 1942.
John T. Croteau, The Federal Credit Union System: A Legislative History, SOC. SEC. BULL.,
May 1956, at 10, 12; Historical Timeline, supra note 26.
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the credit difficulties of rural Americans who had suffered during the Great
Depression and were in dire need of help.34
In the years that followed, Congress sporadically altered the federal
regulation of credit unions.35 A statutory tax exemption was added in 1937,36
in recognition of the benevolent function of credit unions.37 Other
amendments to the FCUA updated its regulatory limits, which were tied to
inflation,38 and transferred FCUA oversight responsibility to various
agencies.39
By 1970, credit unions had expanded in number and industry to reach
beyond farmers.40 In that year, Congress established the National Credit
Union Association41 (NCUA) to create a separate agency specifically to
oversee credit unions to better address the industry’s needs.42 FCUA
supervision was duly transferred to the newly created agency, where it
remains today.43
C. Financial Chaos and the Road to Regulation
The landscape described above stood for over a quarter of a century.44
Credit unions attracted customers by offering higher interest rates on deposits
and charging lower rates on loans.45 But even with this conservative business

34. See About Us, History, FARM CREDIT ADMIN., https://www.fca.gov/about/history-offca [https://perma.cc/X3BQ-QKHQ] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) (describing how farmers are
particularly vulnerable to changes in the economy).
35. See Croteau, supra note 33, at 11.
36. Review of Credit Union Tax Exemption: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 109th Cong. 2 (2006).
37. “Credit unions, unlike many other participants in the financial services market, are
exempt from Federal and most State taxes because they are member-owned, democratically
operated, not-for-profit organizations . . . and because they have the specified mission of
meeting the credit and savings needs of consumers, especially persons of modest means.”
Credit Union Membership Access Act, Pub. L. No. 105-219, § 2, 112 Stat. 913, 914 (1998)
(laying out Congress’s findings regarding the purpose and general principles of credit unions).
38. The original statute capped the value of an unsecured loan that a credit union could
make at fifty dollars. Secured loans could not exceed $200 or 10 percent of the credit union’s
capital, and loans could not exceed two years. Federal Credit Union Act, Pub. L. No. 73-467,
§ 11(d), 48 Stat. 1216, 1220 (1934) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1751); Croteau, supra note
33, at 17.
39. Between 1934 and 1970, responsibility for administering the FCUA was passed
around between six agencies, including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Federal Security Agency, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Ambrose,
supra note 17, at 1142 n.57.
40. By the end of 1960, there were almost 10,000 credit unions in the United States with
over six million members. Historical Timeline, supra note 26.
41. Id.
42. S. REP. NO. 91-518, at 2 (1969) (stating that credit unions have become so significant
to society that they require a more responsive and independent regulatory agency).
43. About NCUA, NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., https://www.ncua.gov/about-ncua/
mission-values [https://perma.cc/PR9X-A8DZ] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
44. Amendments to the FCUA between 1934 and 1998 largely dealt with organizational
matters and are beyond the scope of this Note.
45. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-29, CREDIT UNIONS: GREATER
TRANSPARENCY NEEDED ON WHO CREDIT UNIONS SERVE AND ON SENIOR EXECUTIVE
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model, they could not escape the financial tumult that would begin wreaking
havoc around them.46
The savings and loan financial crisis of the 1980s and 1990s was a
devastating blow and cost billions in losses.47 Savings and loans associations
(S&Ls) are for-profit institutions whose main line of business is mortgage
lending.48 Like all lenders, S&Ls finance their lending with relatively shortterm deposits.49 This model proved vulnerable in an environment of rising
short-term rates50 and S&Ls suffered and required a government bailout.51
Although it is referred to as the savings and loan crisis, credit unions were
affected as well. Credit unions are different from S&Ls in several respects,
but the financing of long-term loans with relatively short-term funds is
common to both institutions.52 With the rising short-term rates of the 1980s,
some credit unions that had issued MBLs failed.53 This forced the NCUSIF54
COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS 26 (2006); Wendy Cassity, Note, The Case for a Credit
Union Community Reinvestment Act, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 340 n.59 (2000).
46. In 1971, President Richard Nixon ended the Bretton Woods system, which fixed
currencies against the U.S. dollar and the dollar against gold at thirty-five dollars per ounce.
Kenneth W. Dam, From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of
American Monetary Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 526, 528 (1983). In 1971, after years of
financing the Vietnam War and a decline in American manufacturing, the conversion rate had
become untenable. See Mark S. Mizruchi & Daniel Hirschman, The Modern Corporation as
Social Construction, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1065, 1096 (2010). The breakdown of the Bretton
Woods system caused rampant inflation that lasted into the 1980s. See Michael Bryan, The
Great Inflation, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/
essays/great_inflation [https://perma.cc/A4VD-J58P]. To bring inflation under control, the
Federal Reserve System sharply raised interest rates. See id. All financial institutions that
borrow short term and lend long term were hit with rising financing costs. MICHAEL S. BARR
ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 14–15 (Saul Levmore et al. eds., 2d ed.
2018). Particularly affected were the savings and loans associations: thrift institutions that
finance investors’ home purchases. See id. at 175. Over a thousand savings and loans
associations failed from 1986 to 1995. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings
and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, FDIC BANKING REV., 2000, at 26, 33. The
Government Accountability Office (previously, General Accounting Office) estimated the
total cost of the failure and the taxpayer bailout at just under half a trillion dollars. Richard W.
Stevenson, G.A.O. Puts Cost of S.& L. Bailout at Half a Trillion Dollars, N.Y. TIMES (July
13, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/13/business/gao-puts-cost-of-s-l-bailout-at-half
-a-trillion-dollars.html [https://perma.cc/YLL5-2MQL].
47. See Stevenson, supra note 46.
48. See Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sullivan, 116 N.Y.S.2d 323, 326–27 (Sup. Ct.
1952), modified on other grounds, 118 N.Y.S.2d 479 (App. Div. 1953) (comparing credit
unions and S&Ls).
49. See BARR ET AL., supra note 46, at 15, 175.
50. Kenneth J. Robinson, Savings and Loan Crisis, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings_and_loan_crisis [https://perma.cc/U4N
5-TVBB].
51. See Stevenson, supra note 46.
52. See BARR ET AL., supra note 46.
53. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CREDIT UNION MEMBER BUSINESS LENDING 11 (2001),
https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Documents/Jan2001Credit
UnionReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DRH-XQBK].
54. The NCUSIF is administered by the NCUA and insures members’ deposits in
federally insured credit unions to protect individuals from loss. See Share Insurance Fund
Overview, NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., https://www.ncua.gov/support-services/shareinsurance-fund [https://perma.cc/8484-8266] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
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to spend between twenty and thirty million dollars to bail these credit unions
out.55
As a result, in 1987, for the first time, the NCUA promulgated regulations
specifically targeted at MBLs.56 These restrictions included a regulatory cap
on the aggregate value of MBLs issued to an individual or group of
individuals.57
MBLs were of particular concern because they have higher delinquency
rates; they are riskier than consumer loans.58 However, during the continuing
years of rising interest rates, the 1987 rules proved inadequate.59 MBLs
continued to default and put stress on the credit unions that granted them. By
the peak of the savings and loan crisis, from 1987 to 1991, business lending
was a factor in sixteen of the thirty credit union failures that cost the NCUSIF
approximately one hundred million dollars.60 Data showed that the most
unstable credit unions had a higher number of MBLs.61 The NCUA
determined that the 1987 rule was insufficient to prevent MBL losses, so in
1991, it promulgated more rules to restrict business lending.62
D. MBLs and the Federal Exemption That Almost Swallows the Rule
Against the backdrop of financial turmoil in the 1980s and 1990s,63
Congress revisited credit union regulation with a particular focus on these
problematic MBLs.
1. The Credit Union Membership Access Act
Eager to avoid another crisis in a different part of the market, Congress
passed the Credit Union Membership Access Act64 (CUMAA) in 1998. The
CUMAA amended the FCUA to define an MBL as “any loan, line of credit,
or letter of credit, the proceeds of which will be used for a commercial,

55. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 53, at 11.
56. Id.
57. “Unless a greater amount is approved by the NCUA Board, the aggregate amount of
outstanding member business loans to any one member or group of associated members shall
not exceed 20% of the credit union’s reserves.” Organization and Operations of Federal Credit
Unions; and Requirements for Insurance and Voluntary Termination of Insurance, 52 Fed.
Reg. 12,363, 12,369 (Apr. 16, 1987) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701).
58. See Organization and Operation of Federal Credit Unions, 56 Fed. Reg. 48,415,
48,421 (Sept. 25, 1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701).
59. “The existing rule and increased examination and supervision efforts have not been
sufficient to stem losses due to problems associated with member business loans.” Id.
60. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 53, at 11.
61. Organization and Operation of Federal Credit Unions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 48,421.
62. The 1991 rules were largely a tightening of MBL regulations that, among other items,
required more diversified portfolios and established new collateral requirements. See
generally id.
63. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
64. Pub. L. No. 105-219, 112 Stat. 913 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
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corporate or other business investment property or venture, or agricultural
purpose.”65 It further stated that with regards to insured credit unions66:
[N]o insured credit union may make any member business loan that would
result in a total amount of such loans outstanding at that credit union at any
one time equal to more than the lesser of—
(1) 1.75 times the actual net worth of the credit union; or
(2) 1.75 times the minimum net worth required under section
1790d(c)(1)(A) of this title for a credit union to be well capitalized.67

The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs reported that
the CUMAA amendments to the FCUA would significantly strengthen
safeguards for credit unions to make the whole system safer, more stable, and
more resilient.68 The report stated that the MBL restrictions would help
credit unions avoid carrying larger commercial loans that could potentially
present a risk to the credit unions and the NCUSIF.69
Against these declarations, however, Congress granted a key exemption to
“an insured credit union chartered for the purpose of making, or that has a
history of primarily making, member business loans to its members, as
determined by the Board.”70 Credit unions that primarily serve low-income
members were also exempt from the above 1.75 regulatory limits.71
The report emphatically noted that the committee intended for this MBL
exemption to be interpreted to keep credit accessible to finance worthy
projects.72 It stated that “[l]oans for such purposes as agriculture, selfemployment, small business establishment . . . taxi cab medallions, tractor
trailers, or church construction should not be unduly constricted.”73
The exemption gave credit unions an easy path around the MBL limit. By
being either a credit union chartered for MBLs or by primarily issuing MBLs,
a credit union could grant these loans practically without limits. That would
65. Id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1757a(c)(1)(A). The statute also lists various exemptions to
the MBL definition that are beyond the scope of this Note. Id. § 1757a(c)(1)(B).
66. Insured credit unions are those in compliance with the criteria of §§ 1781–1790e of
the FCUA, which includes maintaining reserves. See id. § 1752(7). Reserves are the
percentage of a financial institution’s liabilities that it must maintain to pay customers who
wish to withdraw their funds. See BARR ET AL., supra note 46, at 15. This regulatory measure
helps ensure the stability of financial institutions. See id.
67. 12 U.S.C. § 1757(a). The NCUA clarified in a rule that the restriction means that
“[t]he aggregate limit on a credit union’s net member business loan balances is the lesser of
1.75 times the credit union’s net worth or 12.25% of the credit union’s total assets.” 12 C.F.R.
§ 723.16(a) (2016).
68. S. REP. NO. 105-193, at 3 (1998).
69. See id. at 10.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1757a(b)(1). The NCUA board defined “a history of primarily making
member business loans” as when “either member business loans comprise at least 25% of the
credit union’s outstanding loans . . . or member business loans comprise the largest portion of
the credit union’s loan portfolio.” Organization and Operation of Federal Credit Unions;
Appraisals; Member Business Loans; and Requirements for Insurance, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,721,
28,732 (May 27, 1999) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 701, 722, 723 & 741).
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1757a(b)(2)(A). “Low-income” is a defined term under id. § 4702(17).
72. S. REP. NO. 105-193, at 10.
73. Id.
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be consistent with the intent of Congress not to “unduly constrict” MBLs
and, given the higher risk and rates on business loans, would boost credit
union profit.74
One of the supporters of the MBL exemption was the National Association
of Federally-Insured Credit Unions (NAFCU).75 The NAFCU referred to the
MBL regulatory cap as “arbitrary,” “outdated,” and “unnecessary” and
contended that the restrictions must be removed for credit unions to provide
credit to small businesses and help stimulate the economy.76
However, not everyone shared the NAFCU’s view, and the MBL
exemption was controversial on both sides of the aisle. Senator Chuck Hagel
(R-NE) voted against the amendment because he believed that
[t]he legislation is risky for credit union members who rely on their credit
union for small, consumer loans because it would allow credit unions to
shift their focus from consumer service to large-scale commercial
lending . . . . If a credit union were to reach this [1.75 times the minimum
net worth] cap, it would represent more commercial lending than is
generally done by the average community bank.77

Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) expressed similar concerns. Citing NCUA
statistics, he noted that the delinquency rate on credit union business loans
was more than three times the delinquency rate of credit unions’ overall loan
portfolios.78 The senator also observed that by setting the commercial
lending cap higher than existing commercial loan caps, Congress could
encourage credit unions to issue more commercial loans.79 Moreover,
because credit unions largely deal in consumer loans, the senator believed
they were unequipped to safely underwrite these riskier business loans.80
Despite these concerns, CUMAA became law.
In 2001, the U.S. Department of the Treasury published a survey that found
that 25 percent of MBLs were made to members with household incomes of
less than $30,000, and 20 percent of MBLs were issued to households with
incomes between $30,000 and $50,000.81 Just as Congress and the NCUA
74. See id.; see also Organization and Operation of Federal Credit Unions, 56 Fed. Reg.
48,415, 48,421 (Apr. 16, 1987) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701).
75. About Us, NAT’L ASS’N FEDERALLY-INSURED CREDIT UNIONS, https://www.nafcu.org/
about-us [https://perma.cc/UQS2-BR5B] (last visited Nov 3., 2020); Member Business
Lending, NAT’L ASS’N FEDERALLY-INSURED CREDIT UNIONS, https://www.nafcu.org/
mbl/position [https://perma.cc/QRQ9-76GL] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
76. NAT’L ASS’N OF FEDERALLY-INSURED CREDIT UNIONS, 2017 NAFCU REPORT ON
CREDIT UNIONS 22 (2017), https://www.nafcu.org/sites/default/files/data-research/economiccredit-union-industry-trends/industry-trends/Annual%20Report%20on%20Credit%20Unions
/NAFCU%20Report%20on%20Credit%20Unions%20-%202017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
UXX7-M43P]; NAT’L ASS’N OF FEDERALLY-INSURED CREDIT UNIONS, 2016 NAFCU REPORT
ON CREDIT UNIONS 20 (2016), https://www.nafcu.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Data%20%
26%20Tools/Report%20on%20CUs/NAFCU%20Report%20on%20Credit%20Unions%20%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ACF-ASGT].
77. S. REP. NO. 105-193, at 24.
78. Id. at 29.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 53, at 6.
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had intended, lower-income individuals were being granted credit through
MBLs, despite potentially exposing credit unions to risk. In the struggle
between credit union safety and the availability of credit to lower-income
individuals, the latter was gaining the upper hand.
In 2003, the NCUA again loosened the regulatory cap on MBLs. Its intent
was to “revise[] certain provisions that have created unnecessary regulatory
burden.”82 The agency issued a rule that exempted commercial loans for
nonmembers from the MBL cap calculation with a regulatory check to ensure
that the credit unions did not trade loans to circumvent the aggregate limit.83
Absent that, credit unions could issue business loans without running afoul
of the regulation, as long as the borrowers were not members. Thus, the
membership requirement element that had been the formative principle of
credit unions was withdrawn.84 The NCUA vice chairman remarked that
under the regulation, credit unions would benefit from the diversification
provided by nonmember business loans.85 At the time, less than 5 percent of
federally insured credit unions that provided business loans were near the
regulatory cap.86 The rule was unanimously approved by the NCUA board.87
In 2004, the NCUA began issuing waivers that exempted taxi medallion
loans (categorized as MBLs) from certain regulations, including a 20 percent
down payment requirement.88 While the waivers permitted lenders to write
more profitable loans, then chairman Dennis Dollar claimed that the agency
was simply following the congressional intent of the MBL exemption.89 He
interpreted the exemption as a signal to grant more leeway for credit unions
issuing MBLs, otherwise “the average cabdriver couldn’t get a medallion
loan.”90
Congress again revisited the regulation of financial institutions after the
2008 financial crisis, returning to the issue of credit unions and their
problematic MBLs. Testifying before the Senate in 2010 on the postcrisis
soundness of credit unions, then NCUA chairman Deborah Matz
acknowledged that MBLs were either a primary or secondary contributing
factor to instability for credit unions engaged in those types of loans.91
82. Prompt Corrective Action; Corporate Credit Unions; Credit Union Service
Organizations; Member Business Loans; Regulatory Flexibility Program, 68 Fed. Reg.
56,537, 56,537 (Oct. 1, 2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 702, 704, 712, 723 & 742).
83. Id. at 56,543–44, 56,552; see also 12 C.F.R. § 723.16(b) (2016). A nonmember thus
receives a loan without meeting the credit union’s membership requirements. See supra Part
I.A.
84. See supra Part I.A.
85. Sarah Snell Cooke, NCUA Approves MBL Rule, Expansive Community Charters,
CREDIT UNION TIMES (Sept. 30, 2003), https://www.cutimes.com/2003/09/30/ncua-approvesmbl-rule-expansive-community-charters [https://perma.cc/LYY6-VRN7].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Rosenthal, supra note 5.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. The State of the Credit Union Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urb. Affs., 111th Cong. 11 (2010) (statement of Deborah Matz, Chairman, National
Credit Union Administration) [hereinafter Credit Union Health Hearing].
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However, she said the number of credit unions adversely affected by MBLs
was relatively small—approximately 270 of the 2200 credit unions that
issued MBLs.92 Matz took the position that the number of credit unions at
risk because of MBLs was worth the important function they serve for credit
accessibility.93
2. Opposition to Credit Union Deregulation
As the MBL debates continued, the banking industry was particularly
vocal in its dissent. The banks have long had an antagonistic relationship
with credit unions.94 By virtue of their tax exempt and nonprofit business
model, credit unions offer cheaper loans (with reduced rates) to their
members, taking business away from the banks.95 As credit union
membership grew, the banks became more concerned about losing a large
pool of potential customers.96 Today, there are 5164 federally insured credit
unions with combined total loans of over one trillion dollars.97 The banks
did not want to lose this market, so they fought credit unions on two fronts:
challenging the definition of membership in order to restrict it98 and opposing
any advantages bestowed on credit unions.99 The MBL carveout seemed to
be one such advantage. The American Bankers Association testified before
Congress, referring to government reports warning that credit unions were
exposing themselves to more risks through business lending and that they

92. Id. The 270 troubled credit unions were given CAMEL ratings of 3, 4, or 5. Id. at 22.
A CAMEL rating is a uniform system that measures the health of financial institutions. See
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for
Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1167–68 (1988). Under the CAMEL rating guide
published by the NCUA, credit unions given a rating of 3 “may be in significant
noncompliance with laws and regulations.” Appendix A—NCUA’s CAMEL Rating System
(CAMEL), NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., https://www.ncua.gov/regulation-supervision/
letters-credit-unions-other-guidance/appendix-ncuas-camel-rating-system-camel
[https://
perma.cc/LPK3-NZJD] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). CAMEL 4 credit unions are deemed a risk
to the NCUSIF, with failure a distinct possibility. See id. Credit unions with a CAMEL 5
rating “exhibit a critically deficient performance . . . and are of the greatest supervisory
concern.” Id.
93. See Credit Union Health Hearing, supra note 91, at 8 (statement of Deborah Matz,
Chairman, National Credit Union Administration).
94. See Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of
Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2061 (2014) (highlighting the
deep rivalry between banks and credit unions).
95. Reed White, Note, If It Quacks Like a Duck: In Light of Today’s Financial
Environment, Should Credit Unions Continue to Enjoy Tax Exemptions?, 28 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1367, 1379–80 (2012).
96. See Cassity, supra note 45, at 332–34 (describing how credit unions have dramatically
expanded to compete with banks over the banking industry’s dissent).
97. These statistics are current as of June 2020. NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., INDUSTRY
AT A GLANCE (2020), https://www.ncua.gov/files/publications/analysis/industry-at-a-glancejune-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4W9-UQR3].
98. Much of the discussion regarding credit unions is centered around defining the
parameters of the common bond required for credit union membership. Lauzon, supra note
20.
99. See Cassity, supra note 45, at 332–34.
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were exceeding the existing MBL cap.100 In other words, aggressive pursuit
of high interest, risky loans came at the expense of the lenders’ safety and
soundness.101
Within credit unions, too, there were objections to relaxing limits on MBLs
and concerns for the impact of loosening standards on the safety of the
industry. Dale Kerslake, president and CEO of Cascade Federal Credit
Union, expressed those views:
Doubling [member business lending (MBL)] limits for natural person credit
unions is not something a majority of credit unions want or need. Yet, if a
minority of powerful credit unions and industry trade associations get their
way, which they usually do, MBL could easily become the next industry
crisis . . . The proposed MBL limit increase . . . lacks safeguards for the
thousands of credit unions that pay into NCUSIF and do not do business
lending.102

In the battle between accessible credit and safe credit, accessible credit had
won. The MBL exemption remained and credit unions made use of it.
II. THE TAXI MEDALLION CRISIS AND ITS CAST OF CHARACTERS
This part describes the impact of the MBL exemption by examining the
New York City taxi medallion loan crisis. By laying out the chain of
causation that led to the crisis, this part demonstrates how the MBL
exemption is at its core. Part II.A provides a brief history of the taxi
medallion and its roots in New York City. Part II.B explains the factors
behind the multifold rise of taxi medallion prices and introduces key players
behind the price inflation. Part II.C identifies the credit unions’ incentives to
issue more MBLs and describes their poor lending practices in granting these
loans. Part II.D discusses the regulatory agencies that saw the looming
catastrophe and did little to prevent it. Part II.E depicts the crisis from the
view of the borrowers and discusses the predatory lending terms of their
loans. Finally, Part II.F ends the analysis of the medallion crisis by
debunking the idea that ride-hailing apps such as Uber caused it.
A. What Is a Medallion?
A taxi medallion is a permit to operate a taxicab.103 Taxi regulation in
New York City was born out of necessity to manage the unbridled increase
100. See Credit Union Health Hearing, supra note 91, at 62 (statement submitted by the
American Bankers Association).
101. See id.
102. Credit Unions: Member Business Lending: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urb. Affs., 112th Cong. 91 (2011) (statement of Stephen P. Wilson, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, LCNB National Bank) (alteration in original) (quoting Peter
Westerman, MBL Limits—Be Watchful of What Others Wish For, CREDIT UNION TIMES (Feb.
9, 2010, 7:00 PM), https://www.cutimes.com/2010/02/09/mbl-limits-be-watchful-of-whatothers-wish-for [https://perma.cc/D36Q-CYXL]).
103. The term “medallion” originates from the piece of metal typically affixed to the taxi’s
hood but really refers to the license to operate the taxi. Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic
Private Property: The Case of New York Taxicab Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REGUL. 125, 131
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of taxicabs in the 1930s, which brought street congestion, pollution, and
unsafe and uninsured cars to the city streets.104 The medallion system began
in 1937, when the city issued 12,000 of these permits at ten dollars apiece.105
As an income producing asset, a medallion can serve as collateral on
various types of borrowing, including a mortgage or tuition.106 Medallions
had a long-standing reputation for being a dependable and safe investment.107
Taxi driving remained a quiet and steady occupation for many decades.108
In 1979, New York City changed its rules to permit the leasing of cabs and
turned drivers into independent contractors.109 Under the new contractor
designation, drivers did not receive Social Security, disability funding, and
other benefits.110 With this new policy, the demographics of the industry
began to change and in the 1980s, more and more immigrants entered the taxi
driving industry.111 The independent nature of driving, which required little
English proficiency or technical skills, appealed to them.112 Word of the

(2013). “The medallion is of no value as physical property; its great value is as evidence that
the owner has a license to use the vehicle as a taxicab . . . .” Prop. Clerk of Police Dep’t v.
Rosea, 472 N.Y.S.2d 657, 658 (App. Div. 1984), aff’d, 473 N.E.2d 260 (N.Y. 1984);
Rosenthal, supra note 3.
104. The sharp increase in taxis during that time was due to high numbers of unemployed
individuals (after the Great Depression) entering the field because of its low barriers to entry.
Arnold Gevero et al., How Uber and Other Ride-Hailing Companies Are Roiling the Taxi
Medallion Industry, RMA J., Dec. 2015–Jan. 2016, at 36, 37.
105. Rosenthal, supra note 3.
106. Frequently Asked Questions About Taxi Medallion Lending Supervisory Guidance,
NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN. (July 8, 2020), https://www.ncua.gov/regulation-supervision/
letters-credit-unions-other-guidance/frequently-asked-questions-about-taxi-medallionlending-supervisory-guidance [https://perma.cc/LD7G-Z4SG]; Rosenthal, supra note 5.
107. See Gevero et al., supra note 104, at 37–38 (discussing the medallion market’s longstanding impression that the medallion was safe to finance and safe to own); see also Emily
Badger, Taxi Medallions Have Been the Best Investment in America for Years. Now Uber
May Be Changing That, WASH. POST (June 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2014/06/20/taxi-medallions-have-been-the-best-investment-in-america-foryears-now-uber-may-be-changing-that [https://perma.cc/3DRK-GUKN]; Simon Van ZuylenWood, The Struggles of New York City’s Taxi King, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 27,
2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-taxi-medallion-king [https://perma.cc/
4X7Z-QEQZ] (stating that for years medallion ownership was a good investment that often
provided middle-class stability).
108. See Graham Hodges, Opinion, How the Yellow Cab Went Belly Up: Uber Has
Accelerated an Economic Crisis Decades in the Making, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 5, 2018),
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-how-the-yellow-cab-went-belly-up20180803-story.html [https://perma.cc/YL7E-NLYR].
109. Id.; see also Jeff Horwitz & Chris Cumming, Taken for a Ride, SLATE (June 6, 2012,
6:30 AM), https://slate.com/business/2012/06/taxi-medallions-how-new-yorks-terrible-taxisystem-makes-fares-higher-and-drivers-poorer.html [https://perma.cc/UVJ9-62H5].
110. Hodges, supra note 108.
111. See Pete Donahue, The World Fare Cabbies 90% Foreign-Born as Immigrants Grab
Wheel of Fortune, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 7, 2004), https://www.nydailynews.com/archives/
news/world-fare-cabbies-90-foreign-born-immigrants-grab-wheel-fortune-article-1.630371
[https://perma.cc/U7HV-TGWE] (stating that in 1980, 38 percent of taxi drivers were born
outside of the United States).
112. Id.
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job’s dependability spread throughout immigrant communities until the
industry was dominated by foreign-born drivers.113
If one truly wanted to make it in America, driving for a taxi fleet owner
was not enough; one had to own a medallion. To purchase a medallion,
immigrant drivers turned to credit unions to borrow the requisite funds.114
There, the loans were issued according to established lending practices, chief
among which is the relation of the value of the medallion to the borrower’s
ability to repay the sum.115 Still, the demand for medallions was strong.116
While the medallion loans were issued in compliance with conservative
lending standards, the value of the medallion inched up.117 Between 1985
and 1997, medallion prices slowly climbed from $100,000 to $200,000.118
B. Pedal to the Metal: Driving Medallion Prices Up
A key component of the crisis is the exponential growth of medallion
prices and how various members of the industry worked to inflate them.
There are 13,587 taxi medallions in New York City—the highest number of
taxis in the country.119 Some drivers own their individual medallions while
others drive for a fleet owner who bears title to many medallions.120 There
is no reliable statistic on the number of taxi drivers in New York City, but as
most taxis are used by two drivers, each driving a twelve-hour shift,121 it
stands to reason that the number is approximately 30,000.
New York City controls the supply of medallions, which it alone can
issue.122 The Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) is the city agency

113. Id. By 2005, only 9 percent of New York City taxi drivers were born in the United
States. Rosenthal, supra note 3.
114. See Kevin Wack, Taxi Loan Abuses Part of a Broader Pattern in New York, AM.
BANKER (May 24, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/taxi-loan-abuses-part-ofa-broader-pattern-in-new-york [https://perma.cc/4ENF-375T].
115. Cf. Rosenthal, supra note 3. See generally Frequently Asked Questions About Taxi
Medallion Lending Supervisory Guidance, supra note 106.
116. See Rosenthal, supra note 3; see also Hodges, supra note 108.
117. Rosenthal, supra note 3. This typically included a larger down payment and
repayment period of five to ten years. Id.
118. Id.
119. Winnie Hu, Taxi Medallions, Once a Safe Investment, Now Drag Owners into Debt,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/10/nyregion/new-york-taximedallions-uber.html [https://perma.cc/EGB3-GNGK]; Vehicles, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE
COMM’N,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/vehicles/get-a-vehicle-license.page
[https://
perma.cc/8LXN-YP22] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
120. Wyman, supra note 103, at 132–33; Rosenthal, supra note 3.
121. Michael M. Grynbaum, Where Do All the Cabs Go in the Late Afternoon?, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 11, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/nyregion/12taxi.html [https://
perma.cc/PJH7-L6P8] (describing taxi driver shift patterns).
122. “Because taxis are an important part of the public life of the City and have a Citygranted monopoly on providing a crucial service, the taxi industry is pervasively regulated by
the Commission.” Statharos v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 198 F.3d 317, 324 (2d
Cir. 1999); see also About TLC, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/tlc/about/about-tlc.page [https://perma.cc/DR6V-GWQP] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
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tasked with regulating the medallions and has a history of corruption dating
back five decades and through almost as many New York City mayors.123
During the 1990s and early 2000s, former mayors Rudy Giuliani and
Michael Bloomberg stacked the commission with their political allies and
instructed them to sell medallions to reduce the city’s budget deficit.124 The
agency in charge of regulating medallions thus became responsible for
delivering cash to the city. This practice continued under Mayor Bill de
Blasio, who found allies and financial support in the taxi industry.125
Charged with generating money for the city, the TLC had to sell more
medallions and at higher prices.126 The commission determined that a series
of blind auctions would generate the highest revenues.127 To that end, it
began heavily promoting the auctions in an advertising campaign that ran in
a “myriad [of] languages.”128 In newspapers, on the radio, and through
medallion sale seminars, the TLC and Mayor Bloomberg promoted buying a
medallion as “a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.”129
The agency published a special medallion sale issue of the TLC newsletter
with a front page that read: “Taxi medallions also provide both a reliable and
consistent income and guaranteed employment. In addition, a medallion is
collateral that can assist in home financing, college tuition, or even ‘worryfree’ retirement.”130 A column from then TLC commissioner Matthew W.
Daus stated, “With the many financing options available today, almost
anyone with the goal of medallion ownership can participate in the upcoming
medallion sale process.”131 Under Mayors Bloomberg and de Blasio, the
TLC provided the city more than $855 million in medallion sales and
taxes.132

123. See Wyman, supra note 103, at 173–776 (discussing corruption within the TLC during
Ed Koch’s tenure as New York City mayor in the 1980s); see also Rosenthal, supra note 5
(describing how the first chairman of the TLC was convicted of bribery).
124. Rosenthal, supra note 5.
125. Id. Mayor de Blasio received approximately $500,000 from the taxi industry. Yoav
Gonen, Taxi Industry Gave de Blasio Over $550,000 for Campaign, N.Y. POST (May 17,
2014),
https://nypost.com/2014/05/17/taxi-industry-gave-de-blasio-over-550000-forcampaign [https://perma.cc/4AY5-RDBY]; Van Zuylen-Wood, supra note 107.
126. Rosenthal, supra note 5.
127. Id. During the blind auctions, bidders submitted sealed bids above increasing
minimums. Id.; see also Perez-Pena, supra note 1.
128. The Medallion Sale—a New Milestone, TLC TIMES, Winter 2004, at 1, 4, https://www.
nyctaxinews.com/DRIVE_YOUR_FUTURE_TLC_2004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H7XKS282].
129. Joey Fox, City Officials Debate About What to Do About Taxi Medallion Debt Crisis,
GOTHAM GAZETTE (July 26, 2019), https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/8695-city-officialsdebate-what-to-do-about-taxi-medallion-debt-crisis
[https://perma.cc/H9QC-AYCF];
Rosenthal, supra note 5.
130. TLC Medallion Auction Offers Unique Opportunity to “Drive Your Future,” TLC
TIMES, Winter 2004, at 1, 1. The city later added disclaimers that stated past performance did
not guarantee future results but continued to run the advertisements. Rosenthal, supra note 5.
131. Commissioner’s Corner, TLC TIMES, Winter 2004, at 1, 1–2.
132. Rosenthal, supra note 5.
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Some of the immediate beneficiaries of the TLC auctions were the fleet
owners who already owned numerous medallions.133 The blind auctions
increased the value of existing medallions and with that, the value of their
fleets.134 These industry leaders, in turn, entered the auctions to further boost
prices.135 The owner of the largest fleet in the city, a “Taxi King” who owned
around 900 medallions, consistently and purposely overbid in the auctions to
establish a new high market price for the medallions, which increased the
value of his fleet.136 Seeing his success, other fleet owners followed suit.137
Medallion-focused credit unions, free from regulatory limits because of
the MBL exemption, also added credit fuel to the vicious cycle. They
allowed medallion purchasers to borrow increasingly large sums with
disproportionately small down payments and longer repayment periods.138
These lax borrowing terms made it easier to acquire loans and purchase
medallions, and more immigrant borrowers did so.139 The result was higher
credit union profits, higher medallion prices, and more debt for the
borrowers.140
Critically, the credit unions also violated industry best practices by basing
their lending decisions on the inflated market value of the medallions, instead
of a borrower’s ability to repay.141 This resulted in issuing larger loans as
the inflated medallion rate soared.142 The maximum income a medallion
could generate under the best circumstances could support a $400,000
loan.143 However, by 2013, the average medallion loan exceeded
$600,000.144 Between 2002 and 2014, the price of a medallion rose from
$200,000 to over $1,000,000, with negligible change in driver income.145 As
medallion prices climbed, the credit unions changed their loan strategy.

133. See infra notes 135, 137 and accompanying text.
134. In the first auctions in 2004, the bids were over $300,000, a 50 percent increase from
2002, when the price of the medallion was $200,000. See Azi Paybarah, Taxi Industry Leaders
Got Rich. Drivers Paid the Price., N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/05/21/nyregion/newyorktoday/nyc-news-taxi-medallions.html
[https://perma.cc/
V7XW-VXGF]; Rosenthal, supra note 5.
135. Rosenthal, supra note 3 (discussing the Taxi King, among other industry players, who
intentionally overpaid for medallions).
136. Brian M. Rosenthal, The Epic Rise and Hard Fall of New York’s Taxi King, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/05/nyregion/nyc-taxi-medallionsfreidman.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/
2Z9N-TKKF].
137. Evgeny Friedman, the Taxi King, at one point had over $525 million in asset worth
and inspired other industry members to follow his practices. See id.
138. Rosenthal, supra note 3.
139. See id. (describing how, as the medallion prices rose and as some lenders claimed to
have been pushed to write more loans, those borrowing were more frequently immigrants).
140. See id. (discussing how, as the loans being granted were increasingly risky for the
borrowers, medallion prices and credit union profits soared).
141. See NCUA OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 2.
142. See Rosenthal, supra note 3.
143. Jantra Van Roy, The Yellow Cab: A NYC Icon on the Skids, FED. LAW., Aug. 2018,
at 34, 37.
144. Id.
145. Rosenthal, supra note 3.
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C. Credit Unions: Nonprofits Seeking Profits
Although credit unions themselves are nonprofit organizations, they are
managed by executives whose overall compensation packages are linked to
credit union revenue.146 The higher that revenue, the higher the total
compensation for the executives.147 Like their for-profit counterparts, credit
union executives thus have incentives to increase their loan portfolio
values.148
The NAFCU’s 2019 executive compensation and benefits survey listed
factors used to determine the bonuses or compensation for credit union
executives.149 Loan growth, membership growth, net income growth, and
asset growth were among the top five determinants.150 CAMEL ratings,
measures of a credit union’s health that look at capital adequacy, asset
quality, management, earnings, and liquidity,151 ranked fourteenth on the list
in order of importance.152
The performance-based compensation packages of credit union chief
executives help explain their interest in deregulation. The MBL exemption
meant a rise in the credit unions’ assets and interest incomes and with that,
the financial benefits their executives received. Credit unions used the MBL
exception to carry a heavy concentration of risky high interest rate medallion
loans to increase their assets and incomes.153 To that end, they engaged in
corner cutting: they did not adequately analyze the borrower’s financial
statements or monitor the loan performance after it was granted.154
146. 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(8)(i) (2020) states that “no official or employee of a Federal
credit union . . . may receive, directly or indirectly, any commission, fee, or other
compensation in connection with any loan made by the credit union” but specifically exempts
“[p]ayment, by a Federal credit union, of an incentive or bonus to an employee based on the
credit union’s overall financial performance.” Id. § 701.21(c)(8)(iii)(B); see also Daniel
Koslovsky, Executive Compensation at Credit Unions, DEVELOPING ECONOMIST, 2016, at 9–
10 (finding that “the base compensation received by credit union CEOs is significantly
determined by financial performance”).
147. Koslovsky, supra note 146, at 20, 24. Statistics on credit union executive
compensation are rare because credit unions are not required to publicly file the relevant
disclosure forms. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 45, at 6.
148. See Koslovsky, supra note 146, at 14–15.
149. NAT’L ASS’N OF FEDERALLY-INSURED CREDIT UNIONS, 2019 NAFCU-BFB
GALLAGHER EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS SURVEY 17–18 (2019), https://www.
nafcu.org/sites/default/files/2019%20BFB%20Gallagher%20Executive%20Compensation%
20and%20Benefits%20SurveyREVISED.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V3U-XEN9].
150. Id. at 17.
151. See supra note 92.
152. NAT’L ASS’N OF FEDERALLY-INSURED CREDIT UNIONS, supra note 149, at 17.
153. See NCUA OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 1–2. Some of the failed credit
unions held up to 97 percent taxi medallion loans. Id. at 11; Todd Harper, NCUA a Day Late
and a Dollar Short After Delaying Capital Rule, AM. BANKER (Dec. 17, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/ncua-a-day-late-and-a-dollar-short-after-delayingcapital-rule [https://perma.cc/3CX8-LUVX]. Some institutions, such as Medallion Financial,
specifically focused on issuing medallion loans. See Medallion Fin. Corp., Quarterly Report
(Form 10-Q) (May 7, 2015).
154. NCUA OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 2 (describing how the credit unions
failed to safely manage their medallion loans). In a 2014 NCUA supervisory letter issued to
credit unions that discussed lending practices specific to taxi medallions, strong underwriting
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As medallion prices kept rising, credit unions took a page from the
practices of the mortgage industry before the 2008 crisis.155 They extended
the maturity of the loans,156 accepted smaller down payments, and finally did
away with the down payment requirement altogether—all of which helped in
making loans to unqualified borrowers possible.157 Some credit unions
issued interest-only loans that could continue in perpetuity, while others
lasted as long as fifty years.158 Many included a “balloon clause” that
automatically escalated the interest rate to as high as 24 percent if the loan
was not repaid within three years.159 Additional fees were also added to the
medallion loans for paying too early or too late.160 As the bubble neared its
bursting point, many of these lenders quietly exited the medallion business
or sold off the majority of medallion loans they had issued.161

practices included documenting understanding of “[h]ow the borrower operates and generates
revenue” and analyzing the financial capacity of the borrower and principal that, at the very
least, includes an analysis of the borrower’s tax return. NCUA OFF. OF EXAMINATION & INS.,
SUPERVISORY LETTER NO. 14-04, TAXI MEDALLION LENDING 9–10 (2014), https://www.
ncua.gov/files/letters-credit-unions/SupervisoryLetter_TaxiMedallion.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2MV2-D8BQ]. Some lender employees claimed they were pressured by management to issue
more and more medallion loans, which likely contributed to the poor lending practices used.
Rosenthal, supra note 3.
155. See Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357,
429 (2016) (referring to the mismatch between a bank’s longer loan maturity dates and their
assets during the 2008 financial crisis).
156. Extending the maturity of a loan reduces the regular payment the borrower must make
and therefore makes it seem more affordable in the short term. Meanwhile, the amount of
interest that must be paid throughout the life of the loan increases so that overall, the borrower
must pay more. See Amortization Schedule Calculator, BANKRATE, https://www.
bankrate.com/calculators/mortgages/amortization-calculator.aspx [https://perma.cc/6DA6XMNV] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). In the calculator, enter $100,000 under “Mortgage
amount” and 10 under “Mortgage term in years” and then hit calculate. Then enter $100,000
under “Mortgage amount” again and 30 under “Mortgage term in years” and hit calculate.
The difference in the amount in monthly payments and total interest paid between the two
calculations demonstrates the impact of extending the maturity of a loan.
157. See Rosenthal, supra note 3 (discussing how lenders encouraged more and more
borrowing as loan safety standards slackened).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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D. Regulatory Failure
The New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) and the
NCUA were responsible for regulating the different players in this crisis.162
Both were aware of the looming crisis but took little action.163
The DFS observed interest-only loans and other risky practices and began
writing warnings in 2010.164 Concerned examiners gave a presentation in
2014 to the agency’s top officials and suggested revoking charters from some
lenders, but the agency decided only to issue warnings.165 This nonaction
from the state authority was in contrast to its recent aggressive enforcement
measures against a large international bank.166
At the federal level, in addition to waiving regulations, as previously
discussed,167 NCUA examiners discovered that a number of credit unions
were violating lending rules.168 Between 2012 and 2017, examiners issued
informal enforcement actions against credit unions for failing to both assess
the borrower’s ability to repay the loan and monitor the loan itself.169
Moreover, the examiners noted that credit memoranda did not contain
sufficient information for loan officers to make fully informed lending
decisions.170 After repeatedly warning the credit unions to comply,171 the
agency issued an industry-wide supervisory letter in 2014172 but failed to take
serious enforcement action.173 The NCUA seemed to take the position that
credit unions were simply meeting the needs of the borrowers or that the

162. The DFS is responsible for supervising financial institutions chartered in the state.
Who We Supervise, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., https://www.dfs.ny.gov/who_we_
supervise [https://perma.cc/DG69-MS6H] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). This includes some
medallion credit unions, such as Melrose Credit Union and Montauk Credit Union, both of
which the NCUA took possession of due to their unsafe lending practices. NCUA OFF. OF
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 6; Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., NYDFS
Takes Possession of Montauk Credit Union, Appoints NCUA as Conservator (Sept. 18, 2015),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1509181
[https://
perma.cc/5G8P-DPCB].
163. Rosenthal, supra note 5 (discussing how the agencies ignored warnings of the looming
crisis).
164. Id. The state regulatory authority issuing the warnings in 2010 was the New York
State Banking Department. In 2011, it merged with the New York State Insurance Department
to become the DFS. Our History, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., https://www.dfs.ny.gov/
our_history [https://perma.cc/62VF-Q58L] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
165. Rosenthal, supra note 5.
166. See Jonathan Stempel & Carrick Mollenkamp, Standard Chartered May Lose NY
License Over Iran Ties, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2012, 12:13 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-standardchartered-iran/standard-chartered-may-lose-ny-license-over-iran-ties-idUSBRE8
750VM20120806? [https://perma.cc/3FFE-B6PB].
167. See supra Part I.D.1.
168. NCUA OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 2; Rosenthal, supra note 5.
169. See NCUA OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 3, 7–8.
170. In at least two credit unions under the NCUA’s jurisdiction, examiners discovered
vague credit memoranda that would not allow loan officers to make informed lending
decisions. See id. at 1–2, 13–14.
171. Id. at 13–14.
172. NCUA OFF. OF EXAMINATION & INS., supra note 154.
173. NCUA OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 12–13, 19.
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industry would be fine due to its history of stability.174 The NCUA inspector
general’s report later determined that loss could have been avoided if the
NCUA had been more timely and aggressive in its supervision.175 Despite
warnings issued by both agencies, medallion owners signed at least 10,000
loans between 2010 and 2014.176
The TLC has no regulatory authority over lending practices.177 But it, too,
received warnings about unsustainable medallion prices, both from its own
employees and from an internal report stating that the unstable loans would
cause the market to collapse.178 Still, the TLC held sixteen medallion
auctions between 2004 and 2014.179 It also eliminated the annual disclosure
requirement for medallion owners to describe the source of their funds.180
One medallion lender remarked that the city acted more as a partner for the
credit unions in wanting to maximize medallion prices.181
E. The Borrowers: An American Dream Deferred
Immigrant borrowers were eager to own medallions that the city marketed
as “better than the stock market.”182 They signed loan agreements at inflated
interest rates with predatory terms.183 Several lacked the English proficiency
necessary to understand the terms of their loans.184 Some had unknowingly
agreed to severely harsh confessions of judgment that have been banned in
consumer lending185 but, because medallion loans are business loans, such
protections did not apply.186

174. See Rosenthal, supra note 5.
175. NCUA OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 11 (“The loss to the Share Insurance
Fund may also have been mitigated through a more aggressive supervisory approach regarding
unsafe and unsound lending practices, ineffective risk management, and repeat violations of
certain NCUA member business lending regulations.”).
176. See Rosenthal, supra note 5.
177. Id.; see About TLC, supra note 122.
178. Rosenthal, supra note 5.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. (referring to a taxi medallion advertisement issued by New York City).
183. Rosenthal, supra note 3; see also infra note 185.
184. See Rosenthal, supra note 3.
185. Many of the medallion loans included the use of confessions of judgment. Id. These
documents allow for a predatory practice from English common law in which the bank is
authorized to collect the borrower’s outstanding debt by any means necessary. Zachary R.
Mider & Zeke Faux, Sign Here to Lose Everything Part 1: “I Hereby Confess Judgment,”
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018confessions-of-judgment [https://perma.cc/VZR9-EMZF]. Before even taking out the loan,
the borrower signs a statement waiving the right to defend against any legal action brought by
the lender. Id. The lender can then use this confession to accuse borrowers of defaulting
without any proof and can legally seize the borrower’s assets. Id. In 1985, the Federal Trade
Commission banned the use of confessions of judgment in consumer lending practices but not
in business loans. See Complying with the Credit Practices Rule, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-credit-practices-rule
[https://perma.cc/W6NA-3DEB] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
186. Rosenthal, supra note 3.
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Many drivers ended up having to spend nearly all of their incomes on
medallion loan payments.187 Shortly before the bubble burst, medallion
buyers who typically earned $5000 per month were paying $4500 towards
their loans.188 A few discovered that they had only been paying interest.189
When the bubble burst in 2014 and medallion values plummeted,190 some
lenders decided to leave the business and called in their loans.191 Using the
confessions of judgment, the lenders seized whatever assets they could,
including the medallion and any cash in the borrower’s account.192
Borrowers were left with highly unfavorable loan rates on an asset suddenly
worth a fraction of what it had been a year prior.193 Seeing no way out, over
950 owners filed for bankruptcy and most of them lost their medallions.194
At least eight chose suicide.195 The COVID-19 pandemic further decimated
the industry, as taxi drivers are reliant on fares from office workers and rides
to and from airports for income.196 Taxi ridership was down by over 80
percent during the pandemic’s initial peak.197 Nearly 75 percent of taxicabs
were off the city streets by April 2020, and by June, the number of drivers
collecting passengers was 26 percent of what it had been that January.198
Efforts to help drivers have been few and insufficient. For its part, New York
City created the GetFoodNYC program to employ drivers to deliver food to
people in need.199 The largest holder of New York City taxi medallion loans,
Marblegate Asset Management, forgave seventy million dollars of debt and
restructured loans to assist drivers in the wake of the pandemic.200 However,
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. The initial dip was an approximately 20 percent drop before the medallion prices
plummeted by 90 percent. Josh Barro, New York Taxi Medallion Prices Fall Again, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/upshot/new-york-taximedallion-prices-fall-again.html [https://perma.cc/Y879-F77K]; Rosenthal, supra note 3.
191. Rosenthal, supra note 3.
192. Id.
193. Id. A few lenders permitted borrowers to modify their loans or offered ways to release
them from the debt. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Paul Berger, Investment Firm Forgives $70 Million in New York City Taxi-Cab Debt,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investment-firmforgives-70-million-in-new-york-city-taxi-cab-debt-11600012810 [https://perma.cc/S4H49SB2]. Apart from the economic impact of the pandemic, drivers were also concerned about
potentially contracting the virus from a passenger. See Luz Lazo, Another Casualty of the
Coronavirus Pandemic: The Taxi Industry, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2020, 12:35 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/another-casualty-of-thecoronavirus-pandemic-the-taxi-industry/2020/04/25/f96a085a-8009-11ea-80131b6da0e4a2b7_story.html [https://perma.cc/U53L-3ZGY].
197. Offenhartz, supra note 13.
198. NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, COVID-19 IMPACT ON THE NYC FOR-HIRE
INDUSTRY 1, 5 (2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/tlc/downloads/pdf/covid-impactreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/RNJ4-QGUH].
199. Id. at 9.
200. Berger, supra note 196. Somewhat controversially, the NCUA sold the majority of
its medallion loan portfolio to Marblegate before the COVID-19 pandemic, citing the private
entity’s flexibility to work with borrowers. Paul Berger & Miriam Gottfried, Investment Firm
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not all drivers can afford to restructure their loans, and for some, even the
restructured loans are more than they can afford to repay.201 Though
laudable, these measures are insufficient to satisfactorily address the scope
of the borrowers’ ruin. Early talks of an extensive bailout ultimately failed,
leaving borrowers chained to their debts.202
F. Uber: A Plausible but Innocent Scapegoat
Contrary to popular belief, ride-hailing apps such as Uber and Lyft are, at
most, an ancillary part of this story. Blaming the apps for the medallion crisis
was easy and initially seemed plausible, as they had disrupted the market.203
The ride-hailing business model, particularly with respect to Uber, was
singled out as the source of direct competition to the taxicab business and
therefore the cause of the crisis.204
But a closer look at the dramatic surge in medallion prices demonstrates
that the crisis had other causes. Uber did not enter the market until 2011,
when the price of the medallion was already approximately $800,000.205 If
the ride-hailing app was a threat to the taxi medallions, its entry into the
market would have pushed the medallion prices down. However, medallion
prices increased even after Uber’s launch, shooting up to over one million
dollars just a few years later.206 Drivers’ lost income due to Uber and other
apps may have hastened the crisis, but the statutory MBL exemption
ultimately caused the dramatic rise and plunge of medallion prices that
trapped borrowers in debt.207
Buys Taxi-Medallion Loan Portfolio, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/investment-firm-nears-deal-to-buy-around-4-500-taxi-medallion-loans-11582151526
[https://perma.cc/R4RA-F79N].
201. Berger, supra note 196.
202. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
203. Doree Leewak, Ride-Hailing Apps Are Driving NYC Cabbies into Financial Ruin,
N.Y. POST (Mar. 24, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/03/24/ride-sharing-apps-are-drivingnyc-cabbies-into-financial-ruin/ [https://perma.cc/9AY8-M78S].
204. See, e.g., Emma G. Fitzsimmons, A Taxi Driver Took His Own Life. His Family
Blames Uber’s Influence., N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/
01/nyregion/a-taxi-driver-took-his-own-life-his-family-blames-ubers-influence.html?rref=
collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fnyregion&module=inline
[https://perma.cc/SH8ZFEUL]; Hu, supra note 119; Cecilia Saixue Watt, ‘There’s No Future for Taxis’: New York
Yellow Cab Drivers Are Drowning in Debt, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/20/new-york-yellow-cab-taxi-medallion-value-cost
[https://perma.cc/8BUB-FEZ4]. While popular convention blames ride-hailing apps generally
for the crisis, this Note focuses on Uber, as it launched in New York City ahead of its
competitors. Mike Isaac, Lyft Expands Its Car Hailing Service to New York, N.Y. TIMES (July
8, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/lyft-expands-its-car-hailingservice-to-new-york-city/ [https://perma.cc/W4RQ-85AV].
205. Rosenthal, supra note 3; see also Rosenthal, supra note 5.
206. Brian M. Rosenthal, A $1.7 Million Loan, $30,000 in Income. Prosecutors Are Now
Investigating, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/nyregion/
nyc-taxi-medallion-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/AS9F-QA6D] (stating that the price
of a medallion was over one million dollars in 2014).
207. Mathematics further rules out ride-hailing companies as the cause of the crash. The
average income of a New York City taxi driver is approximately $42,000 a year. Occupational
Employment and Wages, May 2019: 53-3058 Passenger Vehicle Drivers, Except Bus Drivers,
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III. THOSE WHO DO NOT LEARN FROM REGULATORY HISTORY ARE
DOOMED TO REPEAT IT
This part draws on information offered in Parts I and II to recommend
statutory loan caps and penalties to prevent this crisis from recurring. Part
III.A explains why simply removing the problematic MBL loophole is not a
satisfactory solution. Part III.B explains the necessity of protecting
unsophisticated players when deregulation exposes them to the free market.
Finally, Part III.C recommends statutory loan rates linked to and capped at
borrower income, with severe penalties for noncompliant credit unions
operating under the MBL exemption. This solution allows credit unions to
continue issuing MBLs but with additional safeguards to protect both the
lender and the borrower.
A. A Difficult Loophole
Another exception of the FCUA demonstrates why simply removing the
MBL exemption would not solve the problem. With legislative intent on
their side, credit unions could argue that the medallion borrowers fall under
the low-income exception of the FCUA, which is also exempted from the
1.75 MBL cap.208 “Low-income” is statutorily defined, with respect to
metropolitan areas, as “having an income . . . of not more than . . . 80 percent
of the area median income.”209 As the average annual income for a New
York City taxi driver is $42,000,210 against the 2020 area median income of
$102,400,211 the credit unions’ argument would be valid. Moreover, as
indicated by the Department of Treasury report, MBLs are necessary.212 To
remove the entire exemption could deny people credit, when the focus must
be on keeping that credit safe while limiting borrower opportunities as little
as possible.
Transit and Intercity, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes
533058.htm#st [https://perma.cc/BQ9W-R5SW] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). The exact
amount of taxi revenue loss due to Uber is disputed. Compare Rosenthal, supra note 3 (stating
that taxicab revenues have decreased 10 percent since Uber entered the market in 2011), with
Gersh Kuntzman, Komanoff: Times Exposé Understated the Damage to Yellow Cab Industry
by Uber and Lyft, STREETSBLOG NYC (May 30, 2019), https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/
05/30/komanoff-times-expose-understated-the-damage-to-yellow-cab-industry-by-uber-andlyft [https://perma.cc/TJR9-3LW7] (describing a letter written by economist Charles
Komanoff, where he claims that taxicab revenue loss due to Uber is 36 percent). Taking the
higher percentage, assuming Uber is responsible for an annual $15,120 loss since its arrival in
2011, by 2020, each medallion owner would have lost at most approximately $136,080 due to
the app. However, average borrowers owe about $500,000 on their medallions. Brian M.
Rosenthal, A Bailout for Taxi Drivers?: The Mayor Says No, but Others Keep Pushing, N.Y.
TIMES (July 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/nyregion/nyc-taxi-medallionbailout.html [https://perma.cc/Y2LE-C9T5].
208. See 12 U.S.C. § 1757a(b)(2)(A); see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
209. 12 U.S.C. § 4702(17).
210. See supra note 207.
211. Area Median Income, N.Y.C. HOUS. PRES. & DEV., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/
services-and-information/area-median-income.page [https://perma.cc/54DN-L5NH] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2020).
212. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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B. Leveling the Playing Field for Borrowers
The taxi medallion crisis is a story of deregulation. Deregulation is the
government withdrawing from private business relations and letting the
parties fend for themselves in the free market.213 But the players in the
market are not equal. An individual borrower is not equal to a credit union
in terms of information, financial strength, and ease of access to the law. In
a dispute between the two, the credit union has a natural advantage over the
borrower by virtue of these inequalities. Markets, in short, naturally lend
themselves to manipulation, further stacking the odds against the
unsophisticated borrower.214 Deregulation thus forces parties into a
marketplace of unequals and under these conditions, the weak parties
inherently often suffer.
The medallion loan crisis exemplifies this. Congressional intent was clear:
deregulating MBLs was designed to afford individuals more opportunity.215
Low-income immigrants were thrust into a market that was tilted against
them and in favor of the self-serving entities that exploited them.216 The
MBL exemption and legislative intent to keep credit flowing to MBLs was
the deregulatory clearance needed for credit unions to loosen their standards
and for agencies to relax enforcement and waive regulations.217
The message that emerges from the medallion crisis analysis is that when
average individuals are pushed into the market by the legislature, they need
more protection than opportunity because they are ill-equipped to fend for
themselves. Absent such defenses, sophisticated players in the market will
take advantage of them.
C. A Sound Proposal for the Safety and Soundness of Lenders
Strong defenses are required to protect unsophisticated parties and defend
them against manipulation. In the realm of lending and borrowing, the most
important protection for a borrower is ensuring one’s ability to repay the loan.
There are well-established standards that determine the maximum loan
amount a borrower with a certain income can afford.218 Where MBLexempted credit unions are concerned, federally mandated protections should
be enacted to link and cap loan principal, interest, and maturity rates to
213. More formally, the goal of deregulation is “to promote economic productivity,
diversity, and flexibility, while recognizing the need, on both economic and noneconomic
grounds, for substantial national intervention into private markets. By relaxing national
controls, these strategies would also promote self-determination at the local level.” Cass R.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 508 (1987).
214. See supra Part II.B.2.
215. See supra Part I.D.1.
216. As previously discussed, New York City wanted to sell more medallions at higher
prices to remedy the budget deficit, the credit union executives wanted to issue risky MBLs,
as their compensation would benefit from the increased income, and the taxi fleet owners
wanted to artificially inflate prices to raise the value of their fleets. All of these actions had a
profound impact on borrower downfall. See supra Parts II.B–C.
217. See supra Parts II.C–D (analyzing the impact the MBL exemption had on credit union
and regulatory agency behavior).
218. See NCUA OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 2.
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borrower income. This would ensure that under no circumstances could
borrowers take out loans wildly disproportionate to their salaries and that
credit unions could not finagle longer maturity rates or smaller down
payments. In other words, it would never be possible for individuals to be
trapped in loans they could not afford to repay. Moreover, if these
restrictions existed at the federal statutory level, agencies like the NCUA
could not simply waive them.219
Though it may seem that such a proposal would prevent low-income
borrowers from purchasing medallions, the opposite is true. As the market
for taxi medallions is comprised of lower-income borrowers,220 the price of
the medallion will drop if they cannot afford to purchase medallions on their
salaries. With a lower price, borrowers could then purchase medallions via
stable and secure means.
As a second line of defense, there must be harsher penalties against
institutions that do not comply. Credit unions that do not abide by such
protections should have their licenses revoked and be ordered to cease
operations. As these credit unions would likely be unstable, CAMEL ratings
would be used to help determine noncompliance. This is what the CAMEL
rating is for: to separate the healthy lenders from the unhealthy and prevent
the unhealthy institutions from operating.221 Moreover, the insurance
certificates of noncompliant credit unions would be revoked, removing their
NCUSIF protection.222 While perhaps less harsh than revoking a credit
union’s charter, this step will have the same practical effect, as few customers
would dare deposit their funds in an uninsured institution.
These penalties may seem severe but, given credit union incentives to issue
risky loans that borrowers cannot afford to repay, they are necessary. Credit
unions are highly sophisticated entities and this crisis demonstrates that when
their limits are relaxed, they will circumvent rules for their own benefits. The
solution thus must be severe to remove such an incentive; warnings and
supervisory letters are demonstrably insufficient to correct the actions of
repeat offenders who have an incentive to offend.223 Further, it is precisely
the severity of these proposals that would make them effective, as the mere
threat of charter or NCUSIF revocation will force compliance. Credit unions
will not want to trigger either, so any fear of credit unions having their
charters revoked and closing—to the detriment of other borrowers—is
unfounded.

219. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 53, at 13, 16–17 (discussing how the
NCUA issued waivers to the aggregate MBL limit, even if the credit unions applying for them
were not in compliance with other regulations).
220. See supra Part II.A.
221. See supra note 92.
222. See supra note 54.
223. See supra Part II.D.
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CONCLUSION
Caught in the tension between trying to grant credit and keeping that credit
safe, Congress created MBL regulatory caps and simultaneously issued the
MBL exemption. The ensuing lack of regulation exposed borrowers to selfinterested actors who exploited their lack of knowledge and saddled them
with ruinous debt. Without federally imposed loan restrictions and severe
penalties for recalcitrant institutions, this crisis will not be a onetime event.
Though the iconic yellow taxicab may suggest that this problem is specific
to New York City, articles following the initial investigation determined that
these practices have spread to other parts of the United States.224 To date,
the improper methods used to devastate New York City cab drivers have
spread to ruin taxi drivers in Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Miami, and San
Francisco.225 These practices turned what began as an asset into a
devastating liability. Unless statutory protections and penalties are enacted
at the federal level to protect these borrowers, sophisticated actors will
continue to prey on some of the most vulnerable of the population—whether
the cab is silver, white, or yellow.

224. Brian M. Rosenthal, ‘We Were Wiped Out’: New Yorkers Preyed on Chicago
Cabbies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/nyregion/taximedallions-chicago.html [https://perma.cc/A2NZ-LXW3].
225. By 2010, almost every Chicago medallion purchase was financed by a New York
lending institution. Id.

